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GAMES OF FIXED RANK:
A HIERARCHY OF BIMATRIX GAMES
RAVI KANNAN AND THORSTEN THEOBALD
Abstract. We propose a new hierarchical approach to understand the complexity of
the open problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. Specifically, we
investigate a hierarchy of bimatrix games (A, B) which results from restricting the rank
of the matrix A + B to be of fixed rank at most k. For every fixed k, this class strictly
generalizes the class of zero-sum games, but is a very special case of general bimatrix
games. We show that even for k = 1 the set of Nash equilibria of these games can consist
of an arbitrarily large number of connected components. While the question of exact
polynomial time algorithms to find a Nash equilibrium remains open for games of fixed
rank, we can provide polynomial time algorithms for finding an ε-approximation.
1. Introduction
Models of non-cooperative game theory serve to analyze situations of strategic interac-
tions. Driven by current developments in auction theory as well as in equilibria models for
the internet, the basic model of a Nash equilibrium has recently attracted much attention
(see for example the survey by Papadimitriou [14] or the recent papers [1, 4, 15, 17]).
In [13], von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the model of zero-sum games, which
are described by a single m × n-matrix A. These games always possess an equilibrium,
and the set of all equilibria (which is a polyhedral set and thus in particular connected)
can be computed efficiently using linear programming (see, e.g., [3]).
Nash investigated the model of bimatrix games (A,B) (and more generally N -player
games) [11, 12], in which the gain of one player does not necessarily agree with the loss
of the other player, thus adding much expressive power to the model of zero-sum games.
By Nash’s results any bimatrix game has at least one equilibrium. However, it is still not
known whether an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, and that question
has been named by Papadimitriou to be the most concrete open question on the boundary
of P [14]. Even approximability in polynomial time is not known; for quasi-polynomial
time approximation algorithms see Lipton, Markakis, and Mehtat [8].
Thus, it will be of interest to impose restrictions on bimatrix games which while pre-
serving expressive power of the games may admit simple polynomial time algorithms.
Recently, Lipton et al. [8] investigated games where both payoff matrices A,B are of
fixed rank k. They showed that in this restricted model a Nash equilibrium can be found
in polynomial time. However, for a fixed rank k, the expressive power of that model is
limited; in particular, most zero-sum games do not belong to that class.
Part of this work was done while the second author was a Feodor Lynen fellow of the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation at Yale University.
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In this paper, we propose and investigate a related model based on low-rank restrictions,
but which is a strict superset of the model of zero-sum games. The viewpoint we start
with is that in a zero-sum game, the sum of the payoff matrices C := A + B ∈ Rm×n is
the zero matrix, which for our purposes we consider as a matrix of rank 0. In a general
bimatrix game the rank of C can take any value up to min{m,n}. Here, we consider the
hierarchy given by the class of games in which we restrict C to be of rank at most k for
some given k. We call these games rank k-games.
Our contributions. We show that the expressive power of fixed rank-games is signifi-
cantly larger than that of zero-sum games. In order to provide this separation, we exhibit
a sequence of d× d-games of rank 1 whose number of connected components of equilibria
exceeds any given constant. Our lower bound for the maximal number of Nash equilibria
of a d× d-game is linear in d. This bound is not tight.
Although the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a game of fixed rank is a very
special case of the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in an arbitrary bimatrix game,
we do not know if there exists an exact polynomial time algorithm for this problem. Note
that the problem strictly generalizes linear programming (see, e.g., [3, Ch. 13.2] for the
equivalence of linear programming and zero-sum games).
However, we provide approximation results for two approximation models. Firstly,
we propose a model of ε-approximation for rank k-games. Using existing results from
quadratic optimization, we show that we can approximate Nash equilibria of constant
rank-games in polynomial time, with an error relative to a natural upper bound on the
“maximum loss” of the game (as defined in Section 4.1).
Secondly, we present a polynomial time approximation algorithm for relative approx-
imation (with respect to the payoffs in a Nash equilibrium) provided that the matrix C
has a nonnegative decomposition.
2. Preliminaries
We consider an m× n-bimatrix game with payoff matrices A,B ∈ Zm×n. Let
S1 =
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = 1 , x ≥ 0
}
and S2 =
{
y ∈ Rn :
n∑
j=1
yj = 1 , y ≥ 0
}
be the sets of mixed strategies of the two players, and let S1 = {x ∈ R
m :
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}
and S2 = {y ∈ R
n :
∑n
j=1 yj = 1} denote the underlying linear subspaces. The first
player (the row player) plays x ∈ S1 and the second player (the column player) plays
y ∈ S2. The payoffs for player 1 and player 2 are x
TAy and xTBy, respectively.
Let C(i) denote the i-th row of a matrix C (as a row vector), and let C(j) denote the j-th
column of C (as a column vector). A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium
if
(2.1) xTAy ≥ xTAy and xTBy ≥ xTBy
for all mixed strategies x, y. Equivalently, (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
(2.2) xTAy = max
1≤i≤m
A(i)y and xTBy = max
1≤j≤n
xTB(j) .
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2.1. Economic interpretation of low-rank games. If A + B = 0 then the game is
called a zero-sum game. The economic interpretation of a zero-sum game is “What is good
for player 1 is bad for player 2”. In order to describe game-theoretic situations which are
close to that behavior, we consider a model where aij + bij is a function which depends
only on i and j
aij + bij = f(i, j)
and where f is a simple function. If f : {1, . . . , m} × {1, . . . , n} → Z is an additive
function, f(i, j) = ui+vj with constants u1, . . . , um, v1, . . . , vn, then there is an equivalent
zero-sum game, i.e., a game having the same set of Nash equilibria. Namely, define the
payoff matrices A′ and B′ by
a′ij = aij − vj , b
′
ij = bij − ui .
That is, A′ results from A by adding the column vector (vj, . . . , vj)T to the j-th column
(1 ≤ j ≤ n) and B′ results from B by adding the row vector (ui, . . . , ui) to the i-th row
(1 ≤ i ≤ m). Now
xTA′y − xTA′y = xTAy −
n∑
j=1
vjyj − x
TAy +
n∑
j=1
vjyj = x
TAy − xTAy
and a similar relation w.r.t. B holds. So the zero-sum game (A′, B′) has the same Nash
equilibria as (A,B). We remark that the case vj = 0 yields the row-constant games
introduced in [5].
If f is a multiplication function, f(i, j) = uivj with constants u1, . . . , um, v1, . . . , vn, this
is a rank 1-game. If f is a sum of k multiplication functions, this is a game of rank at
most k.
Rank-1 games also occur under the term “multiplication games” in the paper [2] by
Bulow and Levin.
2.2. Approximate Nash equilibria. We also consider approximate equilibria. To de-
fine them, suppose x is not necessarily an optimal strategy for player 1 given that player 2
has played y. Then the “loss” for player 1 (from optimum) is maxi A
(i)y−xTAy. Similarly,
if y is not optimal for player 2 given that the first player has played x, the loss for player 2
would be maxj x
TB(j) − x
TBy. We will use the total of these two losses – i.e.,
ℓ(x, y) = max
i
A(i)y +max
j
xTB(j) − x
T (A+B)y
as a measure of how much (x, y) is off from equilibrium. For a matrix X ∈ Rm×n let
|X| = max1≤i≤m,1≤j≤n |xij|.
Definition 2.1. For ε ≥ 0, a pair (x, y) of mixed strategies is an ε-approximate equilibrium
if
(2.3) ℓ(x, y) ≤ ε|A+B| .
Note that the term |A + B| on the right hand side provides a stronger approximation
model compared to the term |A|+ |B|. Also observe that |A +B| is an upper bound for
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the term xT (A + B)y. For a game with A− B 6= 0, a pair of strategies is an exact equi-
librium if and only if it is a 0-approximate equilibrium. Besides the notion of “absolute”
approximation in Definition 2.1, in Section 4.2 we will also consider a notion of “relative”
approximation.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose (x, y) is an ε-approximate equilibrium. Then
(2.4) xTAy + xTBy − xT (A +B)y ≤ ε|A+B| for any other mixed strategies x, y .
Also, conversely, if a pair of mixed strategies (x, y) satisfies (2.4) then it is an ε-approximate
equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows from the equivalence of the statements (2.1) and (2.2). 
2.3. Approximation of games by low rank games. If the matrix C = A + B of a
bimatrix game is “close” to a game with rank k, then the game can be approximated by
a rank k-game (A′, B′) in such a way that the Nash equilibria of the original game (A,B)
remain approximate Nash equilibria in the game (A′, B′).
Definition 2.3. Let (A,B) be an (m× n)-game and C = A+B. If a matrix C ′ ∈ Rm×n
satisfies |C − C ′| < ε(|A + B|) then the game (A′, B′) with A′ = A + 1
2
(C ′ − C), B′ =
B + 1
2
(C ′ − C) ε-approximates (A,B).
Note that A′ +B′ = C ′.
Under the perturbation of the game, Nash equilibria of the original game are approxi-
mate equilibria of the perturbed game:
Theorem 2.4. Let (A′, B′) be an ε-approximation of the game (A,B) and ε < 1. If (x, y)
is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A,B), then (x, y) is a 3ε-approximate Nash equilibrium
for the game (A′, B′).
Proof. The loss ℓ′(x, y) for (x, y) with respect to the perturbed game (A′, B′) satisfies
ℓ′(x, y) ≤ ε+max
i
(A′ − A)(i)y +max
j
xT (B′ −B)(j) − x
T (C ′ − C)y
≤ ε+
ε
2
+
ε
2
+ ε = 3ε

We can apply the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to approximate the matrix C
by a matrix of some given rank k. The approximation factor in Theorem 2.4 is then a
function of the singular values of C.
3. The expressive power of low rank games
3.1. The geometry of Nash equilibria. One measure for the expressive power of a
game-theoretic model is the number of Nash equilibria it can have (depending on the
number of strategies m,n). For simplicity, we will concentrate on the case d := m = n.
If the Nash equilibria are not isolated, then me might count the number of connected
components, but we will mainly concentrate on non-degenerate games in which there
exist only a finite number of Nash equilibria.
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Note that the usual definition of a non-degenerate game is slightly stronger than just
requiring isolated Nash equilibria (see the discussion in [19]).
Definition 3.1. A bimatrix game is called non-degenerate if the number of the pure best
responses of player 1 to a mixed strategy y of player 2 never exceeds the cardinality of
the support supp y := {j : yj 6= 0} and if the same holds true for the best pure responses
of player 2.
If d ≤ 4, then a non-degenerate d × d-game can have at most 2d − 1 Nash equilibria,
and this bound is tight (see [6, 10]). For d ≥ 5, determining the maximal number of a
non-degenerate d × d-game is an open problem (see [18]). Based on McMullen’s Upper
Bound Theorem for polytopes, Keiding [6] gave an upper bound of Φd,2d − 1, where
Φd,k :=


k
k− d
2
(
k− d
2
k−d
)
if d even ,
2
(
k− d+1
2
k−d
)
if d odd .
A simple class of configurations which yield an exponential lower bound of 2d − 1 is the
game where the payoff matrices of both players are the identity matrix Id (see [16]).
The best known lower bound was given by von Stengel [18], who showed that for even
d there exists a non-degenerate d× d-game having
(3.1) τ(d) := f(d/2) + f(d/2− 1)− 1
Nash equilibria, where f(n) :=
∑n
k=0
(
n+k
k
)(
n
k
)
. Asymptotically, τ grows as τ(d) ∼
0.949 (1+
√
2)d√
d
.
If the ranks of A and B are bounded by a fixed constant, then the number of Nash
equilibria is bounded polynomially in d:
Theorem 3.2. For any d × d-bimatrix game (A,B) in which the ranks of both A and
B are bounded by a fixed constant k, the number of connected components of the Nash
equilibria is bounded by
(
d
k+1
)2
.
In particular, for a non-degenerate game the number of Nash equilibria is at most
(
d
k+1
)2
,
i.e., that number is bounded polynomially in d.
Proof. Let A and B be of rank at most k. The column space of Ay has dimension at
most k. By applying Caratheodory’s Theorem on the columns of Ay, it was shown in [8,
Theorem 4] that for every Nash equilibrium (x, y) there exists a Nash equilibrium (x, y′)
in which the second player plays at most k + 1 pure strategies with positive probability.
The same argument can be used to bound the number of pure strategies which are used
by player 1. It follows from that argument that there exists a continuous path from the
original Nash equilibrium to the Nash equilibrium with small support.
Since for a given support of the Nash equilibria, the set of Nash equilibria with that
support is a polyhedral set, the number of connected components of the Nash equilibria
of game (A,B) is at most
(
d
k+1
)2
. 
Now we show that the expressive power of fixed rank-games is significantly higher than
the expressive power of zero-sum games. In order to show this, we prove that the number
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of Nash equilibria of a rank 1-game can exceed any given constant and give a linear lower
bound.
Theorem 3.3. For any d ∈ N there exists a non-degenerate d× d-game of rank 1 with at
least 2d− 1 many Nash equilibria.
The following questions remain unsolved.
Open problem 3.4. Is the maximal number of Nash equilibria for non-degenerate d×d-
games of rank k smaller than the maximal number of Nash equilibria of non-degenerate d×
d-games of arbitrary rank? Is the maximal number of Nash equilibria for non-degenerate
d× d-games of rank k polynomially bounded in d?
In order to prove Theorem 3.3, we use the following representation of Nash equilibria
introduced by Mangasarian [9].
Definition 3.5. For an m×n-bimatrix game (A,B), the polyhedra P and Q are defined
by
P = {(x, v) ∈ Rm × R : x ≥ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities 1,...,m
, xTB ≤ 1Tv︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities m+1,...,m+n
, 1Tx = 1} ,(3.2)
Q = {(y, u) ∈ Rn × R : Ay ≤ 1u︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities 1,...,m
, y ≥ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities m+1,...,m+n
, 1Ty = 1} .(3.3)
A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) ∈ S1 × S2 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there
exist u, v ∈ R such that (x, v) ∈ P , (y, u) ∈ Q and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m + n}, the
i-th inequality of P or Q is binding. Here, u and v represent the payoffs of player 1
and player 2, respectively. For i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we call the inequality xi ≥ 0 the i-th
nonnegativity inequality of P , and for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we call the inequality xTB(j) ≤ v the
j-th best response inequality of P . And analogously for Q.
3.2. A class of low rank games with arbitrarily many Nash equilibria. We con-
struct a sequence (Ad, Bd) of d×d-games of rank 1 in which all pairs (i, i) of pure strategies
(1 ≤ i ≤ d) are Nash equilibria. For convenience of notation, we will omit the index d in
the notation of the game. In order to achieve the desired properties, we enforce that for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , d} the element aii is the maximal element in the i-th column of A and
the element bii is the maximal element in the i-th row of B.
Let us begin with an auxiliary sequence of games (A,B). Let A,B ∈ Rd×d be defined
by
(3.4) aij = bij = −(i− j)
2 .
Then for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d} the element aii is the largest element in the i-th column of
A, and the element bii is the largest element in the i-th row of B. Expanding (3.4) shows
that both A and B can be written as the sum of three rank 1-matrices; since A = B, it
follows that the game (A,B) is a rank 3-game.
In order to transform (A,B) into a rank 1-game, we observe that adding a constant
column vector to a column of A or adding a constant row vector to a row of B does
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not change the set of Nash equilibria. For j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, we add the constant vector
(2j2, . . . , 2j2)T to the j-column of A, and for i ∈ {1, . . . , d} we add the constant vector
(2i2, . . . , 2i2) to the i-th row of B. Let A,B ∈ Rn×d be the resulting matrices, i.e.,
(3.5) aij = 2ij − i
2 + j2 , bij = 2ij + i
2 − j2 .
Since A + B = (4ij)i,j, the matrix A + B is of rank 1. Note that the game (A,B) is
symmetric, i.e., A = BT .
Lemma 3.6. For any mixed strategy x ∈ S1 there are at most two pure best responses for
player 2. And for any mixed strategy y ∈ S2 there are at most two pure best responses for
player 1.
Proof. Let y be a mixed strategy of player 2 with support J := {j1, . . . , jk}. We assume
that there exists a 3-element subset I = {i1, i2, i3} ⊂ {1, . . . , d} such that
(3.6) (Ay)i1 = (Ay)i2 = (Ay)i3 ≥ (Ay)i for all i 6∈ I .
The equations in (3.6) imply that for all distinct i, i′ ∈ I we have∑
j∈J
(
2ij − i2 + j2
)
yj =
∑
j∈J
(
2i′j − i′2 + j2
)
yj ,
which, using
∑
j∈J yj = 1, is equivalent to 2(i − i
′)
∑
j∈J jyj = (i
2 − i′2) . Hence,
2
∑
j∈J jyj = (i+ i
′). The left hand side of this equation is independent of i. Therefore
there cannot be more than two indices in I such that this equation is satisfied for all pairs
of these indices.
The proof of the other statement is symmetric. 
Lemma 3.7. Each of the two polyhedra P and Q has d
6
(d2 + 5) vertices, which come in
two classes:
(1) There exists a j ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that the best response inequality of Q with index
j is binding and all nonnegativity inequalities of Q but the one with index j are
binding (d vertices).
(2) There exist j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , d}, j1 < j2 and i ∈ {j1, . . . , j2 − 1} such that the best
response inequalities with indices i and i + 1 are binding and all nonnegativity
inequalities except those with indices j1, j2 are binding (altogether
∑d−1
k=1 k(d − k)
vertices).
And similarly for P .
Proof. We consider the polyhedron Q. By Lemma 3.6, at most two best response inequal-
ities can be binding at a vertex of Q.
If there is a single binding best response inequality, say, with index i, then, at a vertex v,
at least d−1 of the nonnegativity inequalities must be binding, and therefore there exists
a single index j such that yj is nonzero; hence yj = 1. Now the condition v ∈ Q implies
aij ≥ aij′ for all j
′ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and it suffices to observe that for a fixed j the value aij
is maximized for i = j, and this defines indeed a vertex.
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Now assume that there are two binding best response inequalities i1 and i2 with i1 < i2.
Then there are at most two nonzero components of y, say yj1 and yj2. We can assume
that j1 6= j2 since otherwise we are in the situation discussed before.
We claim that i1 and i2 are neighboring indices. Otherwise there would exist an i
′ with
i1 < i
′ < i2. Now, similar to the calculations in the proof of Lemma 3.6, the property
i′ + i2 > i1 + i2 implies that 2(j1yj1 + j2yj2) = (i1 + i2) < (i
′ + i2) and therefore
(Ay)i′ > (Ay)i1 = (Ay)i2 .
This contradicts v ∈ Q.
Now let i2 = i1 + 1. Computing the solutions for yj1 and yj2 of the equations
2j1yj1 + 2j2yj2 = i1 + i2 ,
yj1 + yj2 = 1
yields
yj1 =
2j2 − (i1 + i2)
2(j2 − j1)
, yj2 =
(i1 + i2)− 2j1
2(j2 − j1)
,
which in connection with y ≥ 0 shows j1 ≤ i1 and j2 > i1.
It remains to show that the stated pairs indeed define vertices. In order to prove this,
we have to show that for i′ < i1 or i′ > i2 we obtain (Ay)i′ < (Ay)i1, which follows in the
same way as in the case i1 < i
′ < i2 that was discussed before.
Now summing up over all the possibilities proves the stated number. 
Corollary 3.8. A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A,B)
if and only if x = y = ei for some unit vector ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, or x = y =
1
2
(ei + ei+1) for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , d− 1}.
Proof. By the characterization of the vertices in Lemma 3.7, the Nash equilibria come
in two classes. If for some i ∈ {1, . . . , d} both players play the i-th pure strategy, then
this gives a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d − 1}, if both players
only use the i-th and the (i + 1)-th pure strategy, there exists a Nash equilibrium. It is
easy to check that in this situation, both players play both of their pure strategies with
probability 1
2
. 
Combining Theorem 3.3 for rank 1-games with von Stengel’s result, we obtain the
following lower bound for rank k-games.
Corollary 3.9. For odd d ≥ 3 and k ≤ d, there exists a d × d-game of rank k with at
least τ(k − 1) · (2(d− k) + 1) Nash equilibria, where τ is defined as in (3.1). For fixed k,
this sequence converges to ∞ as d tends to ∞.
Proof. We construct a d× d-game (A,B) of rank k with
A =
(
A′ 0
0 A′′
)
and
(
B′ 0
0 B′′
)
where A′, B′ ∈ Rk−1×Rk−1 define a (k− 1)× (k− 1)-game with τ(k− 1) Nash equilibria,
which exists by von Stengel’s construction. Moreover, let A′′, B′′ ∈ Rd−k+1×Rd−k+1 define
a (d − k + 1) × (d − k + 1)-game of rank 1 with 2(d − k + 1) − 1 Nash equilibria based
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on the construction in Theorem 3.3. Then the game (A,B) is of rank k and has at least
τ(k − 1) · (2(d− k) + 1) Nash equilibria. 
Remark 3.10. Generalizing the construction in (3.4), for a mapping g : {1, . . . , d} → R
and a polynomial p =
∑n
i=0 aix
i of degree n, the matrix C ∈ Rd×d defined by
cij = p(g(i)− g(j))
has rank at most 1
2
(n + 1)(n + 2). This follows immediately from applying the Binomial
Theorem on p(g(i)− g(j)),
p(g(i)− g(j)) =
n∑
k=0
ak
k∑
l=0
(
k
l
)
g(i)l(−g(j))k−l ,
and observing that the rank of C is bounded by the number of terms in this expansion.
4. Approximation algorithms
4.1. ε-approximating Nash equilibria of low rank games. For general bimatrix
games, no polynomial time algorithm for ε-approximating a Nash equilibrium is known.
In a related model to ours, [8] has provided the first subexponential algorithm for finding
an approximate equilibrium.
Here, we show the following result for our restricted class of bimatrix games.
Theorem 4.1. Let k be a fixed constant and ε > 0. If A + B is of rank k then an ε-
approximate Nash equilibrium can be found in time poly(L, 1/ε), where L is the bit length
of the input.
Set
Q =


0 1
2
(A+B)
1
2
(AT +BT ) 0

 and z = ( xy
)
so that we the quadratic form xT (A + B)y can be written as 1
2
zTQz with a symmetric
matrix Q. We assume that A + B has rank k for a fixed constant k; thus Q has rank
2k. Since the trace of the matrix Q is zero, this matrix is either the zero matrix or an
indefinite matrix. Hence, in the case Q 6= 0 the quadratic form defined by Q is indefinite.
We use the following straightforward formulation of a Nash equilibrium as a solution
of a system of linear and quadratic inequalities.
Lemma 4.2. A pair of mixed strategies z =
(
x
y
)
∈ S1 × S2 is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if there exists an s ∈ R such that
zTQz ≥ s
s ≥
(
A(i) |BT(j)
)
z for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Since zTQz ≤ s in any feasible solution of this optimization problem, we have zTQz = s
for any feasible solution. Hence, the Nash equilibria are exactly the optimal solutions of
the quadratic optimization problem
(4.1)
(QP :) min s− zTQz
s ≥
(
A(i) |BT(j)
)
z for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
z ∈ S1 × S2 .
Vavasis has shown the following polynomial approximation result for quadratic opti-
mization problems with compact polyhedral feasible set [20, 21].
Proposition 4.3. Let min{1
2
xTQx+ qTx : Ax ≤ b} be a quadratic optimization problem
with compact support set {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b}, and let the rank k of Q be a fixed constant.
If x∗ and x# denote points minimizing and maximizing the objective function f(x) :=
1
2
xTQx+ qTx in the feasible region, respectively, then one can find in time poly(L, 1/ε) a
point x♦ satisfying
f(x♦)− f(x∗) ≤ ε(f(x#)− f(x∗)) ,
where L is the bit length of the quadratic problem. Such a point x♦ is called an ε-
approximation of the quadratic problem.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The feasible region of the quadratic program (4.1) is un-
bounded. Since the value of zTQz is at most |A+B| for any feasible solution z and since
the objective value for a Nash equilibrium is 0, we can add the constraint s ≤ |A + B|
to (4.1), which makes the feasible region compact. Denote the resulting quadratic opti-
mization problem by QP’ and recall that the approximation ratio of the quadratic program
depends on the maximum objective value in the feasible region.
By Proposition 4.3, we can compute in polynomial time an ε-approximation (z♦, s♦)
with z♦ = (x♦, y♦) of QP′. Since the optimal value of QP′ is 0, we have
s♦− (z♦)TQz♦ = f(z♦, s♦) ≤ εf(z#, s#) ≤ ε|A+B| .
Hence, (x♦, y♦) is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium of the game (A,B). 
Remark 4.4. The proof in [20] computes an LDLT factorization of the matrix Q defining
the quadratic form and then constructs a sufficiently fine grid in the fixed-dimensional
space. Since the quadratic form xTQy is bilinear, we can also directly apply an LDUT
factorization on the matrix of the bilinear form.
4.2. Relative approximation in case of a nonnegative decomposition. The right
hand side in Definition 2.1 of an approximate Nash equilibrium depends only on ε and
on |A + B|. Since different Nash equilibria in the same game can differ strongly in their
payoffs, we introduce a notion of relative approximation with respect to a Nash payoff
which takes into account these differences.
Consider the quadratic problem (4.1). In a Nash equilibrium (x, y) ∈ S1×S2 there exists
an s ∈ R such that (x, y, s) is a feasible solution to (4.1); in this situation s coincides with
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the sum of the payoffs of the two players. In the relative approximation, we aim at finding
pairs of strategies (x, y) for which there exists an s ∈ R such that (x, y, s) is feasible and
s− xT (A+B)y ≤ ρs .
Using our notion of loss, by observing s = maxi A
(i)x + maxj x
TB(j) for an optimally
chosen s, this means
ℓ(x, y) ≤ ρ(max
i
A(i)x+max
j
xTB(j)) .
We provide an efficient approximation algorithm for the case that C = A + B has a
known decomposition of the form
(4.2) C =
k∑
i=1
u(i)(v(i))T
with non-negative vectors u(i) and v(i).
Theorem 4.5. If C has a known decomposition of the form (4.2) then for any given
ε > 0 a relatively approximate Nash equilibrium with approximation ratio 1 − 1
(1+ε)2
can
be computed in time poly(L, 1/ log(1 + ε)), where L is the bit length of the input.
Let zi = x
T · u(i), wi = (v
(i))T · y. We put a grid on each of the zi and on each of the wi
in a geometric progression: denoting by
(zi)min = min
x∈S1
xT · u(i) and (zi)max = max
x∈S1
xT · u(i)
the minimum and the maximum possible value for zi, we partition the interval [(zi)min, (zi)max]
into the intervals [(zi)min, (1 + ε)(zi)min], [(1 + ε)(zi)min, (1 + ε)
2(zi)min], and so on. And
analogously for the wi.
For every cell we construct a linear program which “approximates” the quadratic pro-
gram (4.1). Let the intervals of a grid cell be [αi, (1 + ε)αi] and [βi, (1 + ε)βi], i.e.,
αi ≤ zi ≤ (1 + ε)αi ,
βi ≤ wi ≤ (1 + ε)βi .
Then for any pair of strategies (x, y) ∈ S1 × S2 falling into that cell, the quadratic form
xTCy satisfies
(4.3)
k∑
i=1
αiβi ≤ x
TCy ≤ (1 + ε)2
k∑
i=1
αiβi ,
where the left inequality uses that all the values in the decomposition are nonnegative.
For the grid cell, we consider the linear program
min s−
∑k
i=1 αiβi
αi ≤ x
T · u(i) ≤ (1 + ε)αi ,
βi ≤ (v
(i))T · y ≤ (1 + ε)βi ,
s ≥
(
A(i) |BT(j)
)
z for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(x, y) ∈ S1 × S2 , s ∈ R .
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In at least one of the cells there exists a Nash equilibrium. The linear program corre-
sponding to that cell yields a solution with
(4.4)
k∑
i=1
αiβi ≤ s ≤ (1 + ε)
2
(
k∑
i=1
αiβi
)
.
Hence, by the left inequality in (4.3) and the right inequality in (4.4) we have
xTCy ≥
k∑
i=1
αiβi ≥
s
(1 + ε)2
.
We conclude
s− xTCy ≤ s
(
1−
1
(1 + ε)2
)
,
which shows Theorem 4.5.
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